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Discussions of fiscal policy in Japan often founder on disagreements over how to read recent 
history. Has counter-cyclical policy had any impact on Japan's economic performance, 
particularly in the 1990s, and is there scope for using it to stimulate the economy now? How 
pressing is the need is to reduce the government budget deficit? Does the size of the government 
debt make any additional fiscal stimulus risky? In fact, fiscal policy has been effective, both prior 
to and during the 1990s. Moreover, Japan's savings- investment balance makes continued use of 
fiscal policy both possible and desirable. 
For the last ten years, debate in Japan has revolved around monetary policy and whether 
or not it has been both prudent and feasible to ease monetary policy further. At the same time, 
there has been little consensus on what fiscal policy should be, which has caused actual policy in 
the last decade or so to swing wildly between opposing goals of  'economic stimulus' and 'fiscal 
revitalisation' or austerity. 
For example, in the early Nineties, economic stimulus was emphasized. Several 
packages of public works spending and tax reductions were implemented in an effort to 
jump-start the economy. In 1997, however, following two years of relatively good growth in 
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1995 and 1996, fiscal policy took a sharp turn toward 'fiscal revitalisation' with an increase in the 
consumption tax and reductions in public works. Then, as the economy began to slow, the debate 
about which fiscal policy was more appropriate became more intense. The government's 
response to renewed economic weakness was very slow, as many in the ruling party argued that 
the long-term health of the government finances was more important than dealing with 
short-term economic fluctuations. A large 16.7 trillion yen stimulus package was finally 
introduced in 1998, when it had become apparent that there was no hope of an autonomous 
recovery. Expanded budgets aimed at stimulating the economy were also implemented in fiscal 
1999 and 20001. Such measures eventually led to at least a temporary bottoming out of the 
economy in 1999 although private demand was very slow to respond, suggesting that the 
elements for a self-sustained recovery were not firmly in place. 
Part of the reason for the large swings in fiscal stance was an error in the government's 
economic forecast. There was also confusion about the effectiveness of fiscal policy and the 
importance of the fiscal deficit (and the way politicians exploited this confusion for their own 
gain). In addition, the shifts reflected voters' widespread dissatisfaction with the wasteful, 
‘pork-barrel’ character of the government's spending programs. 
To give one concrete example, we consider the problem of the relationship between the 
                                                 
1 Translator’s Note. The prospects improved by mid-2000, and it appeared then that the economy was finally 
coming out of the doldrums. 
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'economic recovery' and 'fiscal revitalization' that was the subject of Parliamentary debate in 
early 2000. Then-Prime Minister Obuchi maintained that he "should not be pursuing two hares at 
the same time" to justify his single-minded pursuit of economic recovery.   Yukio Hatoyama, the 
head of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto), retorted that such an argument 
would apply only when "the two hares are running in the opposite directions." It was his view 
that 'fiscal revitalisation' (and an improvement in the allocation of funds) would help bring about 
economic recovery, so that two hares ought to be chased at the same time. 
The US Administration also supported a generous fiscal policy to stimulate the Japanese 
economy, though journalists and academics - and some prominent credit agencies - voiced doubt 
about the wisdom of such a policy. Opponents of an expansive fiscal policy often cite the failure 
of successive stimulus packages - totaling some 100 trillion yen in the 1990s - to achieve any 
lasting improvement in Japanese economic growth2 and contend that what Japan needs is 
                                                 
2 Translator’s Note. Economic Stimulus Measures since 1992 (trillion yen) 
Date Headline Figure Real Water Supplementary Budget 
(Addition to the general 
account) 
31 March 1992 - - - 
28 August 1992 10.7 7.8 2.5 
13 April 1993 13.2 7.4 2.4 
16 September 1993 6.0 2.0 6.4 
8 February 1994 15.3 9.6 2.2 
14 April 1995 - - 2.8 
27 June 1995 - - - 
20 September 1995 14.2 9.1 6.0 
18 November 1997 - - - 
24 April 1998 16.7 12.3 5.1 
16 November 1998 17.0 (approx) 14.1 8.5 
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structural adjustments and fiscal discipline. They claim the focus on economic stimulus merely 
delays the necessary structural adjustment and postpones the inevitable by allowing unworthy 
players to survive longer. 
This essay will attempt to make a critical assessment of the debate and to put Japanese 
fiscal policy into some sort of perspective. In doing so, we look at specific arguments by 
focusing on the following five headings which are examined in turn. (Note, however that point 5 
is such a major issue in itself that it has been discussed in a separate paper written by the 
author3.) 
(1) Has the effectiveness of fiscal policy been permanently eroded in recent years compared with 
earlier periods? 
(2) Does the neutrality theorem -which states rational people react to government fiscal policy in 
a way that offsets the policy thrust-apply in Japan? 
(3) Is the Japanese fiscal position so precarious that priority should be give to reducing the 
deficit? 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 November 1999 17.0 (approx) 6.8 8.1 
19 December 2000 11.0 (approx) 4.7 5.8 
6 April 2001 - - - 
26 October 2001 5.8 0 3.0 
Source: Mizuho Research Institute 
 
3 K. Inoue, Nani ga Tadashii Keizai Seisaku ka [Choices for Japanese fiscal policy] (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 
Inc) June 2000 (Chapter 4)  
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(4) Can there be any means to improve the way public expenditures are allocated? 
(5) Does an expansive fiscal policy delay necessary structural adjustments?  
 
1. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL POLICY 
Discussions of fiscal policy tend to be overly dominated by theoretical or ideological preferences. 
It is wrong, however, to assume that there is a single correct theory that can be applied to every 
country at every point in time. This is because the effects of fiscal policy depend upon the 
reactions of private entities, in particular (a) whether households and companies increase their 
expenditures; and (b) how financial markets react to the increased need of the government to 
fund the deficit. Japan's experience in the last decade offers conflicting evidence, all of which 
needs to be assessed together in order to reach valid conclusions. 
 
1992-94: A period little influenced by policies 
As a starting point, we look at the early 1990s and particularly the period from about 1992 to 
1994 when the economy stagnated as a reaction to the excesses of the bubble period. Faced with 
an economic slump, the government switched its fiscal priority from reducing the deficit - a goal 
that it had pursued fairly consistently through the 1980s - to stimulating the economy. 
Supplementary budgets introduced for this purpose amounted to nearly 8 trillion yen in the three 
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years from 1992 to 1994.  The response of the economy was quite limited, however, and growth 
in real GDP was only 0.4%, 0.4%, and 1.1 % respectively in fiscal years 1992, 1993 and 19944. 
Before this time, fiscal policy in Japan had been considered both an effective and predictable tool 
for stimulating the economy. Thus, sluggish growth in this period led to considerable dismay 
both among policy-makers and private sector economists and gave rise to a debate about whether 
the government spending "multiplier" had become much smaller. The debate found an echo on 
the micro level, as well as, for example, producers of basic materials complained that the demand 
for their products was not rising at a rate consistent with the increase in public works, as had 
been the case in the past. One leading steel manufacturer noted that demand for steel products 
had traditionally risen by 300,000 tons for every one trillion yen incremental increase in public 
works expenditure. However, in the early 1990s that one trillion yen incremental increase let 
only to a 100,000 ton increase in demand for steel. 
With the help of hindsight, however, given the experience since 1995 (see below), it 
appears that the pessimism about the effectiveness of fiscal policy at this time was excessive. It is 
true that the multiplier effect in this period was very small and the economic stagnation 
                                                 
4 Translator’s Note. Growth in Real GDP 
 
Fiscal Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Real GDP 
(yoy change) (%) 
+2.5 +0.4 +0.4 +1.1 +2.5 +3.4 +0.2 -0.8 +1.9 +1.7 -1.8 




protracted. But one can hardly expect a stable value for the multiplier in changing circumstances. 
The effect of fiscal measures on total demand reflects the willingness of households and 
companies to increase their own expenditures in response to the initial gain in income caused by 
increased government outlays. In the early 1990s, there was a huge overhang of excess capacity 
in the form of capital equipment, housing, and consumer durables that reflected over- investment 
during the bubble years. While this is a normal feature of a business cycle, the scale of 
overbuilding in the 1980s was unusually large, and made it inevitable that there would be a 
longer-than-usual period of adjustment. 
 At the same time, there was an unusually large decline in asset prices - specifically, for 
land and shares - following the run-up of the 1980s. This caused an unusually large deterioration 
in corporate and household balance sheets, which added to the constraint on expenditure. 
Moreover, because of the rise in the yen, there was additional pressure on Japanese companies to 
reduce costs and reallocate resources such as factories and labor to maintain competitiveness 
against other East Asian economies. 
It is clear that strong forces were at work during this period, which diminished the 
effectiveness of any fiscal stimulus. Because the multiplier was small at that time, though, does 
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not mean any reduction in the effectiveness of such policies is permanent5. Indeed, a study by the 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA)6 found that the fiscal spending multiplier in the 1990s as a 
whole was only marginally less than in earlier periods. 
It is not surprising that when the multiplier is small on a macro basis, demand does not 
increase in proportion to the level of the increase in public works. Another study by the EPA 
found no reduction, in volume terms, in the use of materials nor in the production- inducing 
coefficient (the degree to which overall production is raised) induced by increased public-works 
construction (1994 White Paper). In other words, the ripple effect on other industries was 
unchanged on a real basis. 
It is also important to consider how to measure incremental fiscal stimuli. The Japanese 
government always announces a "headline" figure, in describing each of its policy packages that 
is much larger than the actual amount of new budgetary outlays in the plan. Indeed, even adding 
up the "real water" in supplementary budgets can greatly exaggerate the actual fiscal contribution. 
This is because the government invariably started with initial budgets that - although ostensibly 
drawn up with "the precarious state of the economy" in mind - were in fact restrictive, usually 
                                                 
5 More specifically: the 1999 White Paper reported findings that, while households’ marginal propensity to 
consume out of new income fell slightly during the 1990s, and the marginal propensity for leakage into 
imports was unchanged – which together imply some decline in the government spending multiplier – the 
degree of “crowding out” and the tendency to push up the yen exchange rate (the Mundell-Fleming effect) 
were both smaller than in the 1980s. This means that the impact of changes in fiscal spending, while it may 
have been smaller in the short term, would have been more lasting in the 1990s environment than it had been 
earlier. 
6 The Economic Planning Agency has since been subsumed by The Cabinet Office 
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projecting a decline in public works spending compared with the previous year's total after 
inclusion of the supplementary budget(s). These initial budgets were described as "stimulative" 
but this was only in comparison with the initial budget of the previous year7. 
As an example, the central government's actual public works outlays for fiscal 1994 
(executed with the money provided by that year's budget) were in fact, smaller than those for 
fiscal 1993--- by 600 billion yen. This incidentally illustrates one of the dangers of relying on 
fiscal expenditures to shore up the economy: Once this approach has been used, it requires bigger 
and bigger doses of spending to have any impact. The metaphor thus becomes one of using 
narcotics - rather than the traditional "pump-priming" image in which the initial stimulus works 
by prompting a quick and self-sustaining reaction from private spending. Further, one must 
                                                 




















Increase in Final 
Budget over 
previous year’s 
Final Budget (%) 
1991 70.3 +6.2 70.6 +0.9 +1.3 
1992 72.2 +2.7 75.3 +2.3 +6.7 
1993 72.4 +0.2 72.4 -3.9 -3.9 
1994 73.1 +1.0 79.0 +1.0 +9.1 
1995 71.0 -2.9 78.0 -10.1 -1.3 
1996 75.1 +5.8 77.8 -3.7 -0.3 
1997 77.4 +3.0 82.3 -0.5 +5.8 
1998 77.7 +0.4 82.3 -5.6 0.0 
1999 81.9 +5.4 89.0 -0.5 +8.1 
2000 85.0 +3.8 83.7 -4.5 -6.0 
2001 82.6 -2.7 86.4 -1.3 +3.2 
2002 81.2 -1.7 - -6.0 - 
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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measure the effect of fiscal stimulus by comparison with what would have happened in its 
absence - not by comparison to the pace of growth that might have been desired. Indeed, the 
economy would have experienced a deep recession in these years if it had not been for the 
support from fiscal policy. The direct contribution to overall demand growth - that is, before 
considering any multiplier effect - of public investment amounted to 2.0 percentage points in 
fiscal years 1992-94, exceeding the total cumulative growth of GDP of 1.5%. (Public 
investment 8 corresponds to the total year on year increase of public works investment by both 
central and local governments executed during this period after the supplementary budgets.) This 
of course means the economy would surely have posted negative growth had it not been for the 
fiscal stimulus. 
 
1995 to 1997: A review 
The experiences in 1995-97, in contrast with the early 1990s, demonstrated that fiscal policy 
CAN have a sizable impact on the economy, in both positive and negative directions.  Fiscal 
policy remained stimulative in both fiscal 1995 and 1996. On top of the "special" (i.e., 
temporary) income tax reduction that was introduced in 1994 and continued through 1996, which 
                                                 




totaled 9.5 trillion yen, a permanent tax reduction (of 3.5 trillion yen each year) was introduced 
in September 1995 along with a large injection of public works spending. 
Aggregate demand was thus sustained. Moreover, the post-bubble stock adjustments in the 
private sector had run their course, and growth of private non-residential investment resumed. 
Real private non-residential investment, which had declined for three consecutive years between 
fiscal 1992 and 1994, registered an increase of 3.6% in fiscal 1995, and then accelerated to 8.5% 
in fiscal 19969. Reflecting this vigorous investment, year on year growth of real GDP rose to 2.5 
and 3.4%, respectively, in fiscal 1995 and 199610. These were high growth rates by international 
standards for this period. Meanwhile, the contribution of public investment to changes in real 
GDP tapered off to 0.6% for fiscal 95 and -0.2% in fiscal 199611. 
                                                 
9Translator’s Note. 





+1.0 -9.2 -11.1 -4.5 +3.6 +8.5 +8.9 -5.1 -0.3 +9.3 -4.7 
Source: Economic and Social Research Institutes, Cabinet Office (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/) (December 
2002) 
 
10Refer Note 4 
 
11 Translator’s Note 
Fiscal Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Contribution to 
Real GDP 
Growth made by 
Public 
Investment (%) 
+0.3 +1.1 +0.9 -0.1 +0.6 -0.2 -0.5 +0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 




Economic process does include autonomous, cyclical mechanism, but cyclical swings should be 
understood to be very large if unmitigated by policy, particularly when confidence is eroded12. It 
is more natural to interpret the expansion of the economy in 1995-96 as due to fiscal policy 
regaining its former impact. So, while the favorable impact of fiscal policy was apparent to many 
who lived through this period, sceptics could still argue that the economic cycles always produce 
an end to stock adjustments. They might further say that this period simply coincided with an 
autonomous cyclical upturn that had very little to do with fiscal policy.  
This argument is hard to refute since we cannot experiment with the economy. It would 
be easy to use econometric models to say that the trough would have come much later but for the 
fiscal stimuli. But those models only show the average of past behaviours and there is no 
knowing how close to the average economic agents would have behaved in the absence of fiscal 
policy. 
However, it is certain that the economy would have shown negative growth in the 
                                                 
12 There is usually a tendency for the economy to become stronger during times of strength and weaker during 
times of weakness. This is due to the short-term cycle of production ® income ® expenditure, which is 
effective in only one direction at time being either expansionary or contractionary. Nevertheless, apart from 
this trend for one direction, there is a mechanism concerning capital investment, housing and durable consumer 
goods whereby the stock levels are adjusted to desired levels based on the long term demand from companies 
and households taking account of income prospects. In addition, concerning retail consumption, changes in 
consumption levels are kept even and there is pressure to maintain average levels. The economic cycle uses the 
strength of these mechanisms to counteract the one directional short term cycle mentioned above. When it is 
exceeded we can say there has been an autonomous turnaround (peaking out or a bottoming out). From this 
perspective, in the early 1990s we can see the breakdown in the ‘myth of an ever rising market’ and asset price 
deflation led to a reduction in desirable levels of investment in fixed capital. This was also a period during 
which consumers adjusted their attitudes towards consumption. Consequently, the above-mentioned 
mechanism for an autonomous turnaround became even more difficult. As a result of the pessimism 
concerning the actual prospect of low growth, it has been difficult to complete stock reductions. 
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previous period --notwithstanding the fact that the multiplier had become small. As stock 
adjustments in housing, consumer durables and fixed capital is a process in which economic 
agents try to balance the stock of these items with the present incomes and future demands, it is 
safe to say that adjustments would have been more prolonged if the economy did not grow, albeit 
very meagerly.  
In any case, circumstantial evidence for the importance of fiscal policy is clearly to be 
found in the period 1997-98, when no fiscal help was forthcoming despite the economic 
downturn. Every economic force worked in a contractionary direction; there was no source 
of autonomous upward momentum at all. There can be little doubt that the economic downturn 
that started in the middle of 199713, and which eventually turned into a severe recession, was the 
result of an abrupt turn in the government's fiscal stance. 
The impact of a switch away from a stimulative fiscal policy was amply demonstrated in 
the spring of 1997 when the government placed priority on "fiscal restructuring," or discipline, 
assuming that the economy had entered a sustainable recovery path. The consumption tax was 
raised from 3 to 5 percent, the "special" temporary income tax reduction was discontinued, and 
public works investment was curtailed. 
                                                 
13 Admittedly, this is also the period when Japan’s economy suffered from the negative impact on exports 
from the economic crisis in emerging Asian economies. That episode made the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus 
even more untimely that it would otherwise have been. But it cannot be blamed for the economy’s downturn, 
since net exports contributed positively to total demand in both fiscal 1997 and 1998. 
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Following the change in policy-and arguably in response to that changed policy-- there 
was a sudden, swift decline in the economy against a backdrop of widespread concern about the 
viability of the financial system as Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi 
Securities all collapsed in November 1997. 
The effects were immediate. Household income fell, as did personal consumption.  And 
since one person's consumption is somebody else's income, the multiplier effect assured that this 
led to a downward spiral of aggregate consumption and income levels. Many people had 
expected that "rational" consumers would reduce their savings ratio to offset their consumption, 
as called for by the neutrality theorem (see below), but this did not happen. 
Real private non-residential investment also fell. As of the first half of 1997, the 
corporate sector was largely unaware that there was excess capacity. In 1997, the investment 
cycle was still at a fairly young stage and there was not a large accumulation of capital stock. But 
after showing a year on year rise of 8.9% in fiscal 1997, such investment plummeted to minus 
5.1% in fiscal 199814. The implication is clear: investment in fixed capital would not have 
entered such a severe adjustment but for the sudden decline in demand. 
The government absolutely failed to predict this downturn. The Economic White Paper 
for 1997 was very upbeat on the economy, saying "the transition from the policy-supported 
                                                 
14Refer Note 9 
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recovery to an autonomous recovery centered on private demand is more or less complete." The 
Bank of Japan was considerably more cautious, but it too thought that a downturn could be 
avoided, saying: "The pace of recovery might decelerate for the time being, but there are good 
chances that the upward momentum itself would be maintained."15 One of the basic factors 
behind these forecasts was the "immaturity" of the recovery. In other words, the failure to 
maintain a stimulative policy had a major, unfortunate impact on the Japanese economy in 1997. 
 
1998: The exceptionally large supplementary budget 
Real GDP recorded quarterly declines in 1997 and 199816 as the recession became one of the 
most severe in the post-war period. By February 1999, industrial production had dropped 12.5% 
from its peak. Meanwhile, unemployment set a post-war high and exceeded 4% by April 1998. 
However, the government initially did little, letting the economy run its course, partly out of a 
false sense of optimism and partly because of its commitment to reduce the budget deficit. (The 
Law to Reform Government Financial Structure17, which pledged the central and local 
                                                 
15 Bank of Japan Monthly, June 1997 
16 Translator’s Note 
Calendar Year Q1/97 Q2/97 Q3/97 Q4/97 Q1/98 Q2/98 Q3/98 Q4/98 Q1/99 Q2/99 Q3/99 
Growth in Real 
GDP (qoq)  (%) 
+1.6 -3.1 +1.7 +0.4 -1.1 -0.5 +0.1 +0.2 -1.0 +2.1 +0.9 
Source: Economic and Social Research Institutes, Cabinet Office (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/) (December 
2002) 
 
17 This law pledged the central and local governments together to post a combined deficit no more than 3% of 
GDP by fiscal 2003. 
 17
governments together to post a combined deficit no more than 3% of GDP by fiscal 2003 was 
adopted in 1997.) 
It was only December 1997, at the time of the submission of the budget for fiscal 1998, 
that the government first changed its stance slightly with the offer of 2 trillion yen in "special" 
tax relief. By this time, however, the economy was clearly in trouble; a small dose of fiscal 
stimulus could hardly reverse it. Then, in April 1998, the government was forced to change 
course once more and proposed an unprecedented 16.7 trillion yen stimulus package. This 
package was not only large in scale; it also went well beyond the traditional 
public-works-spending approach to include income tax reduction and tax incentives for housing 
investment. 
Why did the government fail to understand the gravity of the economic situation? There 
is some doubt as to whether the error in the government's economic outlook at this time was just 
an "honest mistake," meaning that it did what it could given its own flawed estimates of the 
economy. Instead, it appears that government forecasts around this time were made to support 
the government's predetermined fiscal stance, and were not based on careful analysis of 
economic data. 
It took quite a while after the shift in fiscal stance before the sentiment clearly improved. 
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In terms of real GDP, however, the effects were to appear very quickly. The second quarter of 
calendar 1999 already showed a turn around to a substantial positive number, and growth in the 
third quarter was also positive, albeit much smaller18.  
The composition of real GDP growth in this period suggests clearly that this 
bottoming-out was brought about by policy, and not the result of an autonomous recovery. Fixed 
business investment, which is a major determinant of economic activity, in fact kept declining, 
reflecting the surge in the sense that there was excess capacity. It is no exaggeration to state that 
the growth at the time was entirely led by public works that fostered personal consumption as 
well as housing investment, (which benefited from tax incentives and other policy measures). In 
addition, comprehensive measures to deal with problems in the financial system also helped19. 
These measures succeeded in calming down the panicky mood amongst companies and also 
facilitated the smooth flow of credit to small- and medium-sized companies. 
In short, there were several periods in the 1990s when fiscal policy was actively used 
with varying degrees of efficacy. In the early 1990s, fiscal policy did not have a strong impact. 
However, this was an exception rather than the rule. From the mid-1990s onward, economic 
                                                 
18 Translator’s Note. The second quarter of calendar 1999 showed real GDP growth of 2.1% (qoq, saar), and 
the following quarter had growth of 0.9%. Source: Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. 
 
19 Translator’s Note. Households’ reaction to the unprecedented news of major financial institutions’ 
bankruptcy – most particularly that of Yamaichi securities – had been a major contributor to the downturn, and 
their reassurance by these measures was a precondition for ending it. 
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cycles were the result of shifts in fiscal stance: positive in 1995-96; negative in 1997; and 
positive again in 1999. 
These experiences suggest that fiscal policy can be a powerful counter-cyclical 
influence; it is only in exceptional circumstances that it is not. The history of this period suggests 
that reducing budget deficits and stimulating the economy are not compatible at least in the short 
term. Putting aside the issue of how government money is allocated - which, as discussed below, 
can be greatly improved- the two "hares" referred to in the Parliamentary debate between Obuchi 
and Hatoyama are running in opposite directions, forcing policymakers to chose between the 
two. 
 
Creation of money supply through fiscal spending 
Fiscal policy was an important path for money creation throughout almost the entire decade of 
the 1990s. Following the turmoil in the credit-markets in late 1997, as banks became cut back 
their lending, money supply would have shrank but for the fiscal deficit which the banks 
financed. 
A fiscal deficit tends to directly increase money supply because the government is 
giving out more money to the private sector than it is taking in. (Sometimes, the resultant deficit 
is financed by the private, non-bank, sector through the purchase of government bonds. While 
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fiscal spending disperses funds and creates money, if the bonds issued to finance the spending 
are purchased by non-bank players, the purchases by such players will be matched by a 
corresponding reduction in cash holdings. However, during this period, despite an easy monetary 
policy, there was not much demand for money, nor willingness on the part of banks to lend, 
leading the banks to buy up the newly issued government bonds instead. When government 
fiscal deficit leads to money creation, it is called "monetization" of the deficit, and it is common 
to assume the central bank's underwriting of government bonds as the primary route for this. 
Although the Bank of Japan never engaged itself in such an operation, "monetization" in the 
broad sense took place thanks to the commercial banks' purchases of government bonds. 
This can be seen by examining the "credit counterparts" of money supply. This approach looks at 
the asset side and the net worth of the combined balance-sheet of the banking sector. Bank 
deposits, as the main component of money supply, appear on the liability side of such 
balance-sheet. The following chart shows the "supply routes" of money by this approach. It is 
clear from the chart that commercial banks' credit extension to the public sector contributed to 
money creation in the 1990s, in fact, since the beginning of 1998, it has been the most important 
source of money creation. In other words, despite a credit crunch, fiscal policy had a double 
economic impact by creating money as well as adding to the effective demand as banks supplied 
credit to the public sector. 
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Chart. Changes in Money Stock (M2+CDs) and Credit in Japan 
 
Source: Bank of Japan (<http://www.boj.or.jp>) (December 2002) 
  
Many economists presuppose that money supply can be increased if the central bank so wishes. 
The basic framework of analysis of the IS-LM ('Investment - Savings' - 'Liquidity - Money') 
model is a case in point. But such a framework is quite inadequate in understanding Japan's 
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2. THEORETICAL OPPOSITION TO THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis and The Neutrality Theorem 
Theoretical opposition to the effectiveness of fiscal policy has been put forward, most notably by 
several prominent American economists. One argument against the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
is the "neutrality theorem" (also known as the "rational expectations" hypothesis). In a nutshell, 
this theory argues that if people are rational in their forecast of the future, the government's effort 
to prop up the economy by increasing public expenditures or cutting taxes will only lead 
consumers to expect tax increases at some future date. This in turn induces them to curtail their 
present consumption, offsetting the impact of larger public expenditures. According to this theory, 
a temporary tax reduction would also be ineffective. This implies that the effect of fiscal policy is 
neutral to the course of the economy. Robert Lucas, one of the very early proponents of this 
theory, received the Nobel Prize for economics in 1995. Some empirical research results on 
Japan as well as a brief survey of literature are presented in the Economic White Paper for 1998. 
This hypothesis is by no means firmly established, as the empirical results presented to support 
the theory are open to different interpretations. It is easy to conceive of a household to which this 
theory does not apply: If a household is so poor as to consume all its earnings - under a liquidity 
constraint - it cannot save for the future tax increase and this hypothesis would clearly not apply. 
However, it is widely accepted that current consumption for moderately well-off households 
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depends not just on cur rent income but also on future earning prospects - that is, permanent 
income. There is a broad consensus, at least, that the effects of policy actions depend on how 
they impact people's outlook and expectations. 
Those opposed to active use of fiscal policy in Japan often refer to the huge size of the 
deficit rather than cite the neutrality or rational expectations theory. In the debate leading to the 
tax reduction in 1998, however, some insisted that the reduction had to be "permanent" to have 
any impact on consumption. Clearly, the debate was influenced by these concepts. Indeed, in the 
parliamentary debate of February 2000, Mr. Hatoyama of the opposition Democratic Party 
referred to the "neutral theorem" in his attack on the Government's stance of putting priority on 
economic recovery.  
As already noted, the effects of fiscal policy were relatively weak in the first half of the 
1990s. This, taken alone, might be interpreted to mean that Japanese people had become more 
"rational" in their expectations as budget deficits grew. However, economic cycles since then, 
namely a strong recovery in 1995-96, a sharp turnaround in 1997 and the bottoming-out in 1999 
all originated from the strong impact of fiscal policy. It is clear that the "neutrality theorem" does 
not always apply since movements in the government sector in Japan were not completely offset 
by private sector moves in the opposite direction. Also, it is more plausible to interpret the earlier 
caution in 1992-94 as the result of severe stock adjustment pressures and the deterioration in 
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balance sheets rather than as the result of people becoming more "rational". 
 
Very "irrational" consumer behavior---experiences at the time of the rise in consumption 
tax rate. 
The raising of the consumption tax rate from 3% to 5% in April 1997 serves as a good test case 
of the theory of the rational consumer. The temporary tax relief, which had been effective for a 
three-year period up to then, was also discontinued. It is noteworthy that both measures had been 
announced three years beforehand. If consumers were "rational" as defined by the theory, they 
would have raised their savings ratio in the three-year period when taxes were temporarily low, 
and would have lowered their savings after the awaited tax increase became effective. However, 
the exact opposite occurred. Instead, personal consumption declined after April 1997 and the 
savings ratio shot up. 
Of course, the "rational expectations hypothesis" was not tested in its pure form. As in 
all tests of hypotheses in social science, other things were not equal. The unexpected rise in the 
savings ratio must have reflected other factors, too. In late 1997, awareness was growing that 
national pension schemes were nearly bankrupt. Moreover, financial system turmoil shook public 
confidence following the collapse of several large and well-known financial institutions such as 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. Furthermore, unemployment was also on the rise. 
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Still, given that the large-scale fiscal stimulus measures adopted in fiscal 1998 succeeded in 
bringing about a bottoming-out, it is hard to assert that people's expectations were formed 
"rationally." It is particularly hard to claim that personal consumption in Japan was much 
influenced by the public's expectations of future tax increases and any reduction in personal 
spending would offset the effects of fiscal policy. Such expectations affect consumption far less 
than the level of current income and/or the fear of losing one's job. 
The government's Economic White Paper for 1998 concluded that: "With the deepening 
of the recognition about the budget deficit, people are getting more sensitive to its widening...In 
this situation, it cannot be ruled out that an expansion of the budget deficit will no doubt, by 
giving rise to the fear regarding their future (tax) burdens, lead to households becoming cautious 
when increasing their expenditures." The White Paper further said, in a footnote, "circumstances 
have been changing into one where neutrality theorem would apply more." The 1999 White 
Paper cited this footnote and reiterated the same message. 
 It is a bit incongruous that the same 1999 White Paper stressed the process through 
which fiscal policy had led to the bottoming-out of the economy as "the result of audacious and 
quick actions." If the neutrality theorem had applied, as the Paper implied elsewhere, fiscal 
policy would not have been effective no matter how "audacious and quick" the measures might 
have been. This inconsistency probably reflects the view of some elements within government 
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circles that wished to put a lid on the use of fiscal policy. Be the cause as it may, evaluation of 
policy actions has to be consistent. The summing-up at present juncture then ought to be: 
Notwithstanding the fact that the public is increasingly more aware and concerned about future 
taxes and pension schemes, the effect of fiscal policy in stimulating the economy is still very 
large. 
 
3. HOW PRECARIOUS IS JAPAN’S FISCAL POSITION? 
How money is spent is much more important than the revenue gap 
Many analysts, both inside and outside of Japan, believe Japanese government finances are 
already close to collapse, and cite the ratio of either the current deficit or cumulative government 
debt to GDP as proof. By either measure, Japan's fiscal situation is indeed the worst among 
industrialized countries. Some go further and assert that the true picture is even worse, 
considering the rapid aging of the population and its impact on state pension schemes. These 
analysts say priority should be given to restoring discipline to government finances even if the 
short-term impact on the economy is negative. For example, American economist Paul Krugman 
asserts there is no room to use fiscal policy and proposes that Japan should adopt inflation 
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targeting20. 
In these arguments, the state of government finances is usually measured by the gap 
between revenue and spending, with little discussion of the overall level and allocation of 
expenditures. The 1997 Law to Reform the Structure of Government Finances reflects such 
thinking. However, the truly relevant issue concerning government finances is whether the level 
and direction of spending are appropriate, given the current needs of the country.  
To single out only the fiscal deficit (i.e., the gap between revenue and expenditures) and to 
compare it with the GDP, and to further argue that it is a burden on future generations, can be 
both misleading and incorrect. A given level of deficit spending can be either  "good" or "bad" 
depending on how the money is spent. (The tax system, which is an important issue in discussion 
of the budget problems, is beyond the scope of this paper.) 
 
The magnitude of the deficit 
First, consider just the magnitude of the deficit and government debt. To use the often-cited 
figures of comparison with the GDP, estimates in the Economic White Paper 2000 were for the 
combined deficit of central and local governments for fiscal 1999 to reach 9.2% of GDP, while 
                                                 
20 P. Krugman, “Japan’s Trap” (May 1998), (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/japtrap.html) and “Further 
Notes on Japan’s Liquidity Trap” (June 1998) (http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/liquid.html) 
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the gross debt at the end of fiscal 2000 was expected to reach 129.3% of GDP 21. 
Since GDP measures the total value-added in a given period, it might legitimately be 
compared with the size of government economic activities. But there is no economic reason why 
GDP should be compared with the fiscal deficit22. Since the fiscal deficit represents the excess of 
investment over savings by the government, it is far more important to see it in the context of the 
investment-savings balance of the nation as a whole23. 
The flow-of-funds accounts are designed to do this. On a flow basis, the "flow-of funds" 
accounts show that the excess of investment over saving by the government sector was indeed 
very large in 1998, but the excess of savings over investment by the corporate and household 
sectors was even larger, so that Japan as a whole still had excess savings amounting to 16 trillion 
yen. This total excess savings corresponds to Japan's current account surplus in that year - which 
                                                 
21 Translator’s Note. For reference more recent data compiled by the OECD shows the following trend: 
Calendar Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Combined deficit of central and local governments/ 
GDP (%) 
5.3 6.7 7.8 7.3 7.0 7.3 










  Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance citing OECD – Economic Outlook (Issue No. 70, December 2001) 
 
22 However, if we look at the framework for future spending, it is important to consider whether or not the 
accumulated debt (= outstanding government debt) will be contained below a certain level. Therefore, this 
concerns the relationship between growth in revenues and the growth in GDP (the elasticity of tax revenues for 
GDP) as well as interest rate levels. 
 
23 It should be said that – in contrast with the situation in other countries – nearly 50% of Japan’s outstanding 
government debt is actually held by the public sector itself: this includes the large holdings of the social 
security fund, the government’s Trust Fund Bureau, the Bank of Japan, and the postal savings and postal 
insurance systems. Even so, however, the level of net debt has been rising rapidly and is no longer extremely 
low by international standards. And, perhaps most importantly, the size of current government deficits assures 
that this net debt will keep growing at a very fast pace.  
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by definition represents the accumulation of net foreign assets by the country as a whole. 
Next we look at the flow-of-funds accounts on a stock level basis. The combined net debt of 
central and local governments (financial assets less financial liabilities) amounted to 422 trillion 
yen at end-March 199924. At the same time, the combined net debt of the private non-financial 
corporate sector stood at 483 trillion yen25 while the household sector held net financial assets of 
944 trillion yen26. Reflecting the balance of these positions (together with some minor omissions), 
Japan as a whole showed a net overseas assets of 136 trillion yen27. 
More importantly, these figures show that central and local government borrowing is far 
from exhausting the domestic savings pool. And that is exactly why long-term interest rates are 
                                                 
24 Translators Note. Revised data as of December 2002 
End of Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Net Debt of Central and Local Governments 
(Financial Assets less Financial Liabilities) (Trillion 
yen) 
358 422 461 493 521 
Source: Bank of Japan  (http://www.boj.or.jp) (December 2002) 
 
25 Translators Note. Revised data as of December 2002 
End of Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Combined Net Debt of the Private Non-financial 
Corporate Sector (Trillion yen) 
523 483 587 487 413 
Source: Bank of Japan  (http://www.boj.or.jp) (December 2002) 
 
26 Translators Note. Revised data as of December 2002 
End of Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Household Sector Held Net Financial Assets (Trillion 
yen) 
932 944 1,027 1,017 1,011 
Source: Bank of Japan  (http://www.boj.or.jp) (December 2002) 
 
27 Translators Note. Revised data as of December 2002 
End of Fiscal Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Net Overseas Assets (Trillion yen) 128 136 88 135 176 
Source: Bank of Japan  (http://www.boj.or.jp) (December 2002) 
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so low in Japan, (indeed, they have never been lower at any time in history). 
It is true that financial assets held by the central government in the above figures may 
include some assets, such as loans to special public corporations, which have deteriorated in 
quality, suggesting the true picture may be somewhat worse than the above figures imply. 
However, what is important concerning the balance sheets of central and local governments is 
not actual net worth but how appropriate the level and direction of spending is, factors which are 
much more important than the gap between revenue and expenditures. 
 
How imminent is the risk of "crowding-out"? 
"Crowding-out," refers to a situation where the government and the private sector vie for real 
resources such as labor and capital and the government squeezes out the private sector.  
The fiscal deficit should always be considered relative to the overall savings-investment balance. 
The most critical question as regards government finances is whether an over-grown government 
will take up resources that could be used more productively by the private sector. Such 
"crowding-out" of private demand is the true cause of any possible "burden on future 
generations".  
To establish the extent to which crowding-out may or may not take place, consider the 
extent of shortfall or excess after the country's total savings is divided between the government 
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and the private sector. Japan still has large excess savings even after the public and private 
sectors have shared such savings. Thus, government debt does not currently constitute such a 
burden. 
This is a crucial difference from the situation of the United States of the 1970s and 
1980s, or of some of the high-deficit European countries more recently. In both instances, the 
government's fiscal deficits exceeded domestic private-sector savings; interest rates stayed high 
and discouraged private investment, always the crucial engine of autonomous growth (especially 
since in these circumstances, monetary easing is not very effective). 
Though it might appear obvious, it is important to spell out just why "crowding-out" 
constitutes a burden on future generations. In the case of a developed country with a modern, 
functioning infrastructure, the use of resources by the private sector generally tends to be more 
efficient than that by the public sector and raises the productive capacity of the economy more28. 
Should the government embark on greater expenditure than its role demands, the private sector is 
left with fewer resources, resulting in lower productivity gains and hence lower overall economic 
growth. Future generations are left with a lower standard of living than they might otherwise 
have had. 
                                                 
28 Note 7 A study by the EPA, reported in the 1996 White Paper, showed that in Japan the effectiveness of 
public works expenditures in raising the economy’s output potential declined markedly in the latter half of the 
1970s. Though the study found that the output-to-capital ratio recovered slightly starting in the mid-1980s, it 
was still only about a quarter of what it had been in the late 1960s – the era when Japan’s “industrial policy” 
earned its reputation for boosting growth. 
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Conversely, if public expenditures are productively allocated – be they on infrastructure or 
environmental protection or whatever- then there is no need to worry about the deficit or 
"crowding-out." If the public sector uses resources as efficiently as the private sector, the 
deficit---even when there is one--- is a "good deficit".  
This can be compared to the situation of a company that is running an operating deficit 
at present but investing in promising projects. The capital markets would view the current loss of 
such a company in light of the prospects for the future and hence the perception would be 
different to that of a loss incurred by a company with uninspired and conservative management. 
What really matters is not the size of the deficit, but how wisely the money is spent. 
From the financial perspective, fiscal expenditure will result in higher interest rates and the 
curtailment of private sector investment. From such a financial angle, it may seem that what is of 
primary importance is the amount of government's funding, that is, the size of the deficit. 
However, this is not the case. 
Suppose a "big government" finances its deficit by a tax increase and posts no deficit. In 
this case there is no tapping of the market for funds by the government, but the increased taxes 
would cause the savings pool of the private sector to contract, so interest rates might still rise. On 
the other hand, when there is sizable excess capacity and unemployment - that is, when 
unutilized savings are large - government funding would likely be amply covered by such excess 
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savings and would not cause any "crowding-out" especially if monetary policy is not tight. 
Even the above-cited Economic White Papers, which tend to stress the negative aspects 
associated with the fiscal deficits, are sanguine on this point. The 1998 White Paper, for instance, 
said "at present...the negative impacts arising from crowding-out effects.... do not have to be 
taken too seriously." The report saw little need for concern unless private demand for funds soars 
or monetary policy shifts to a tightening bias29. 
Might huge deficits cause confidence in government bonds to be shaken? If there were 
real wide spread fears regarding the Japanese government's ability to repay its obligations, 
government bond yields would rise but not long-term rates in general. 
 
Generational accounting: Is the deficit a burden on future  generations? 
Fiscal deficits (i.e. government borrowings) become a burden on the future generation when a 
bloated public sector reduces the economy's growth potential or when the government deficit is 
funded by borrowing from abroad. 
                                                 
29 Translator ’s Note. In the 2000 edition, the EPA staff reported on the work they had done to 
ascertain the relationship between government financial needs and long-term interest rates, saying 
in a footnote that there was no statistically significant correlation between the size of the government 




Still, much of the criticism of the LDP's economic policies by the main opposition party, the 
Democratic Party of Japan, is based on the argument that the government debts was a burden on 
the future generations, just as a father's debt is a burden on his son. Arguments put forward when 
the Law to Reform the Fiscal Structure was passed reflected this so-called generational 
accounting and helped produce the shift in the government fiscal stance in 1997 away from 
emphasizing support for the economy to the objective of "restoring health in government 
finances. 
This "generational accounting" approach calculates the impact of the government's 
fiscal measures separately for each age group. Consequently, there is no comparison for the 
extent of benefits to the middle-aged to old people at the expense of young (or future) 
generations. 
Suppose, for example, tax relief has been introduced now with a promise that taxes will 
be raised in the future. Present taxpayers, who will be dead by the time of future tax increase, 
enjoy the benefits while those who become taxpayers when the tax increases take effect are 
worse off. Is this a case of a burden passed on to future generation?  Not really. To understand 
why, consider two groups: the present generation and the future generation. The only way the 
present generation leaves a burden on the future generation is if the present generation consumes 
more than they produce and pays for the difference by borrowing from somebody else. A burden 
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is left to the future generation when a country as a whole is borrowing from abroad. The future 
generation then has to limit consumption below the level of production to repay the debt. 
Borrowing by a government, on the other hand, so long as it is funded by domestic savings, 
merely represents a transfer of money among that country's residents. 
In order to see this last point more clearly, note that the current account balance 
measures the difference between a country's production and consumption Countries with current 
account deficits are then spending more on goods and services than they are producing, and the 
difference is added to their external indebtedness. Future generations in such countries must run 
current account surpluses, by consuming less than they produce to repay the debts. 
Of course it is possible for expenditures to fund projects that enhance future production 
capacity. In this case, the future generation may have net gains even after repaying the debt. The 
current account deficit then is a "good" one. 
The deficit of a government, in contrast, merely represents the difference between 
government revenue and expenditures. So long as it is funded by domestic savings the above 
problem does not arise. Those who pay taxes to redeem the debt and those receiving the 
repayment of principal and interest - that is, bondholders - are both Japanese domestic residents. 
It is only when a country's current account is already in deficit that government borrowing 
becomes a burden for future generations. In the case of contemporary Japan, fiscal policy to 
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stimulate the economy does not alter the size of the current account surplus much. 
In the case of government finances, it is not necessary to balance revenue and 
expenditures. Nor is there a need to reduce the amount of existing government debts to zero. 
"Equalizing the tax burden among different age groups" is an important objective, but it does not 
make the deficit itself a burden, and it does not lead to a conclusion that reducing the deficit 
should be given top priority.  
The greatest danger is not the debt of the government per se but that Japan's long-term 
growth potential might be impaired by the inappropriate use of resources arising from an in 
appropriate fiscal policy.  There is ample empirical evidence that the business outlook of Japanese 
companies is strongly influenced by current economic conditions. 
Expectations tend to be self- fulfilling because they influence the  investment plans of the 
corporate sector. When many companies become pessimistic, they curtail their investment and 
the pessimistic forecast is realized. The effect of a policy error can thus be fairly long lasting. 
 
Inequality amongst age groups  
There remains, however, the question of inequality in the burdens placed on different generations 
when a tax cut now is offset by a future tax increase. Unlike the case of the current account 
deficit countries mentioned earlier, there is no excess of total consumption over output by the 
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present generation. It is true that future generations have higher tax burdens, but they have also 
inherited government bonds from the present generation and are receiving principal and interest 
payments. They do not have to restrain their own consumption in order to repay debts to overseas 
creditors. 
Still, even though these interest payments are only a money transfer within the future 
generation, the higher general tax level that they require could have consequences, such as 
depressing incentives and entrepreneurship, or even prompting an exodus of people and 
companies. That could become a serious burden on future generations but it is a burden arising 
primarily from big government, not from fiscal deficits. 
If the priority is to balance the budget within a certain period, it does make sense to 
expedite tax increases that may be needed to reduce the future interest payment burden and 
equalize burdens placed on different age groups. The 1999 Economic White Paper presented 
estimates showing that the future burden on the present young population would be unbearably 
heavy if tax increases are not instituted very soon. 
This calculation presented by the EPA is very misleading, however. The assumptions 
used here are 2% for the growth rate of GDP per capita and 4% for real interest rates. However, it 
is hard to believe that Japan's sluggish economy could provide interest rates of 4% in real terms. 
Second, the target year for the EPA's 1999 White Paper exercise is not revealed. If, as 
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seems likely, the calculation is based on a fixed future point in time, then it is natural that the 
burden of the present young will grow as the tax increases are delayed. A more natural 
assumption would be that the target year would also be postponed if the tax increases were 
delayed. The suspicion arises that the government constructed its calculations with a pessimistic 
bias, as part of its campaign for "fiscal restructuring". 
It might be added that the most often-cited example of inequality among age groups is 
the obligatory state pension scheme. Those who are presently middle-aged salaried employees 
joined the scheme years ago, with the understanding that they would be eligible for pensions 
when they became 55. That age keeps being extended, and many are not sure whether they will 
ever reach it. On the other hand, there are many older people who have been receiving pensions 
since they were 55. Indeed, women were initially eligible when they were only 50. 
The "generational accounting" approach is useful for addressing these problems. But the 
basic error concerning the state pension scheme is to have used a drastically wrong population 
forecast and to have designed a system in which the retired are supported only partly by their 
past contributions and mainly by the working age groups. As the ratio of those working to those 
retired keeps declining, the burden on working-age Japanese is becoming unbearable. The 
solution to this problem cannot be postponed. However, the nature of the problem of overall 
government finances is very different from that of the state pension scheme. 
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Qualitative issues: The long-term issues concerning Japan's government finances 
To show that that the size and allocation of expenditures are much more important than the gap 
between revenue and expenditures, let us consider what is defined as the "balanced budget 
multiplier" in economics. Theory states that the effects of simultaneous increases in taxes and 
government expenditures are stimulative, although the fiscal balance remains unchanged. This is 
so because the propensity to spend of the private sector is normally smaller than unity, so that a 
transfer of income to the government, whose propensity to spend is unity in this case, would 
have a positive effect. 
If the biggest problem concerning government finances at present is the size of the 
deficit, is it proper to raise taxes and increase expenditures at the same time, thereby trying to 
achieve the twin objectives of stimulating the economy and restoring fiscal balance? The answer 
to this should be quite obvious. If such policies were repeatedly used, the resultant "big 
government" would not only use resources inefficiently but also rob the private sector of vigor. 
There is indeed a long-term risk in Japan that the public sector might become bloated, using 
resources inefficiently and reducing the growth potential of the economy. If "restoring the health 
of government finances" is an objective encompassing such concerns, its priority is high. In the 
long run that hare is running in the same direction as the hare of growth. But fiscal streamlining 
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in the narrow sense aimed at reducing the deficit, particularly the objective of "reducing the 
deficit even at the cost of higher taxes", is not the task that should be accorded top priority in 
Japan of the late 1990s and early 2000s. 
This does not preclude the possibility that priorities may shift in the future. Specifically, 
if the aging of the population reduces aggregate savings and results in the current account 
balance-of-payments turning into deficit - although this is by no means is inevitable - the need to 
reduce the deficit itself may rise. As things stand now, however, there is a room for Japan's fiscal 
policy to further contribute to the task of bringing the economy back on to an autonomous and 
sustained growth path. It should be borne in mind at the same time that if the policy priority is 
shifted to "restoring fiscal health" in the near future, emphasis should be placed not on reducing 
the deficit but on reducing the overall size and making the allocation more in line with true needs 
(as opposed to the needs of those with loud political voice). 
 
4. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURES 
One of the reasons that the active use of fiscal policy has been unpopular among the public - 
most notably among those living in big cities, as amply demonstrated in recent general 
elections  - is the feeling that money is not flowing where it is truly needed but instead is wasted 
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on useless projects. It is well known that the allocation of public works has been extremely rigid, 
with projects well past their usefulness continuing to attract funds. Those involved in the process 
of budget formulation confess that even a 0.1 percentage change in distribution requires 
enormous effort. 
The process by which actual projects are decided after the budget is passed by the 
Parliament has also attracted public skepticism. The budget only gives a broad mandate such as 
"improving roads", while the actual allocation is negotiated behind closed doors among 
politicians and bureaucrats acting in response to requests from local authorities. 
In addition, there are many cases where the central government gives out money to 
localities to induce them to start projects, without any demonstrable need. Analyses of costs and 
benefits are often neglected; indeed, in numerous cases, they result in waste and/or damage to the 
environment. For example, in 1999, "coupons to stimulate localities" were distributed to 
everyone at or under the age of 15 and to those receiving old age pensions. This can well be 
called an ultimate "throw-away policy;" reminiscent of Milton Friedman's famous allusion to 
"throwing away cash from a helicopter"30. 
Igarashi and Ogawa have provided a good insight into the process of determination of 
                                                 
30 M. Friedman, “Prescription for Japan: Back to the Future,” Asian Wall Street Journal, Dec 18, 1997 
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the allocation of public works expenditure31. They point out that the Parliament only decides on 
big items. Then, when it comes to deciding on concrete projects, no democratically accountable 
system is at work. 
To come up with better resource allocation is easier said than done, however. Most 
politicians seem to have given up even trying, unfortunately, in fact all past efforts at reducing 
the deficit used "the ceiling method:" that is, they set a uniform rate by which most items were 
cut across the board. Sadly, this method enjoyed wide support from the politicians. 
To decide on the allocation of public resources, setting priorities among competing projects, 
should be one of the basic roles of a politician. To support the "ceiling method", then, is to 
abdicate this important role. The public is also to blame, however, for demanding that everybody 
suffer to the same degree when times are hard.  A telling episode was reported a few years ago 32: 
The heads of the five villages located along one of Japan's coast lines met a Ministry of Finance 
official, and each wanted a fishing port built in his village. The Ministry official said that five 
ports would be extremely difficult, but that he could give favorable consideration if the five 
village heads could agree among themselves on only two ports. The heads replied that they did 
not want two ports. Either no port at all or all five was their wish. (Eventually all five ports were 
                                                 
31 Takayoshi Igarashi and Akio Ogawa, Kokyo jigyo wo do suru ka? [What should be done about public works 
projects?], Iwanami Shoten (1974)  ISBN4-00-430492-X C0231 
32 Mainichi Shimbun, 28th April, 1997 
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established.) 
Not surprisingly, politicians aim to draw public works projects to their constituencies. 
That of course is hardly unique to Japan. Nor should it be condemned outright in a democracy. 
Still, two problems stand out as hindering efficient allocation of resources. First, because 
negotiations are carried out behind closed doors, the outcome tends to reflect the relative power 
of individual politicians. Second, many public works are carried out either by the central 
government with its own money or by local authorities with heavy central government subsidies. 
This means that local authorities rarely foot much of the bill. 
Under the present system, a project for which there is no real need can still be drawn to 
a region simply because it would benefit local construction companies. But, if local authorities 
were required to foot the bulk of the bill, they would be forced to assign priorities among the 
competing needs of the region, and could not avoid making "this or that" choices. 
 
The case for more decentralization and the Freedom of Information Act 
Decentralization can he lp to limit wasteful use of resources. Local governments should have to 
choose "either this or that" If regions have more financial autonomy, they would (in principal) 
only initiate one project by sacrificing another. This would result in much more thorough and 
realistic cost-benefit analyses than those undertaken under the current system. 
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To be sure, some measures to lessen regional inequality in income probably are needed. 
But this goal can also be achieved by giving poor regions untied subsidies, requiring them to 
fund their projects from their own purse. The idea that the central government has to control 
local governments because local governments tend to waste resources is no longer accurate. If 
decentralization results in an uneven social infrastructure across regions, it should be accepted as 
the outcome of varying choices made by local residents. There naturally could be some merit in 
the central government setting a national minimum standard. 
The Freedom of Information Act, which was put into effect in 1999, is potentially a 
strong weapon in improving the implementation of fiscal policy. That public works are allocated 
through political processes is both natural and inevitable. Up to now, however, there has been 
little transparency neither in those processes, nor in the ex ante and ex post evaluations. It was 
never clear who decided what, on what authority.  
But if the public asks for information on these points, as they now can, and demands 
accountability from politicians and bureaucrats, it would be an important first step in improving 
the decision making on what public works are approved. 
Needless to say, the Freedom of Information Act is not a panacea. There have been cases 
in which some politicians twisted a railway route or made express trains stop at their 
constituencies. They were widely condemned by the general public but had overwhelming 
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support from their constituencies. This implies a need to change the framework itself so that the 
limit of what politicians and bureaucrats can do becomes clearer and choices for them become 
more in the nature of "either this or that". The aim is not to build a system that can work well if 
properly run, but to have a system with an institutional check to assure that it won't be run 
improperly. In any case, while there is a long way to go, the Freedom of Information Act does 
make it easier for the public to monitor the spending decisions of their elected representatives. 
 
The need for a more effective cap on government finances 
This paper has argued that fiscal policy should be actively used as the primary tool to stimulate 
the economy, a belief based chiefly on economic considerations. (Monetary policy should do its 
part, too, of course.) At the same time, it is true, given the current realities that it is extremely 
difficult to trim the size of the government once it has been allowed to grow. Given this 
legitimate concern, it is worthwhile to consider ways to set an effective cap on government 
finances. 
The Government in fact introduced such a cap in 1997, in the form of the "Law to 
reform the fiscal structures". That cap was a cap on the deficit rather than the more preferable 
route of imposing a cap on the size of government expenditures and was, in any case, soon 
suspended. The ideal solution would be to tie any cap to the state of the economy, say by having 
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the government commit itself to reduce the size of government expenditure relative to GDP 
whenever the expected growth rate of GDP exceeds 2%. 
Such a cap would enable the government to use fiscal policy when there is need while 
simultaneously ensuring that the growth of the public sector does not get out of hand. To insist 
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General Manager of the Akita Branch of the BoJ from 1989 to 1991. From 1995 to 1999 he was 
Advisor to the Governor of the BoJ, Research and Statistics Department. After leaving the BoJ in 
1999 he joined Kobe University as Professor in the School of Business Administration. 
His writings on the Japanese economy have appeared in both Japanese and English in 
publications such as the Nihon Keizai Shimbun and the Asian Wall Street Journal. His last major 
work was a book in Japanese published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun in June 2000 – Nani ga 
tadashii Keizai seisaku ka [What’s right with Japanese economic policy?]. 




Kengo Inoue very much wanted the non-Japanese speaking world to have an insight into the 
views of Japanese economists and an understanding of the debate taking place within Japan. 
Well-versed in English, Kengo prepared the first English draft of this paper himself, based on 
Chapter 2 of his book, Nani ga tadashii keizai seisaku ka – gendai makuro seisaku ronsou no 
kenshou [What’s right with Japanese fiscal policy? An examination of the debate on current 
macro policy], published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (June 2000). Following Kengo’s 
untimely death in March 2001, Kengo’s wife – Henny Sender and other friend’s of Kengo 
(including myself) were keen to disseminate the English paper that Kengo had been working on. 
We also felt that despite the passage of time, Kengo’s analysis and observations concerning 
Japanese fiscal policy remain relevant today. The paper retains the integrity of Kengo’s own 
work in English. My work as translator has been to clarify that Kengo’s English draft coincided 
with the original Japanese and that any changes in his English draft were intentional. While 
amendments to some expressions in Kengo’s English draft have been made the content remains 
the same with the exception of revisions to data. Data has been revised to reflect subsequent 
events or official revisions as cited in the footnotes. A number of people have contributed to the 
final work. In particular, my task has been greatly eased by initial editing and review by Masaaki 
Kanno and Patricia Hagan Kuwayama. I would also like to thank Takeshi Shibasaki of Mizuho 
Securities for helping to locate much of the updated data. Lastly, I would like to express my 
thanks for the final editing and overall vision of Henny Sender who, more than anyone, wanted 
to share this work with non-English speakers so they too could have an insight into the Japanese 
economy and the views of one particular economist - Kengo Inoue. 
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